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NEGOTIATED SOVEREIGNTY:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS WITH

AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES AS MODELS
FOR EXPANDING SELF-GOVERNMENT
David H. Getches*
Constitutional issues related to First
Nations sovereignty have dominated
Aboriginal affairs in Canada for a
considerable period. The constitutional
entrenchment of Aboriginal selfgovernment has, however, received a
setback with the recent failure of the
CharlottetownAccord in October of 1992.
Nonetheless, day-to-day issues must be
accommodated, even while this more
fundamental constitutional question
remains unresolved. This paper illustrates
the American experience with negotiated
intergovernmental agreements between
tribes and individual states.
These
agreements have, for example, resolved
jurisdictionaldisputes over taxation, solid
waste disposal, and law enforcement
between state governments and tribal
authorities. The author suggests that these
intergovernmental agreements in the
United States provide a useful model to
resolve lingering issues, effect practical
solutions and expand First Nations selfgovernment in Canada.

Les questions constitutionnelles relatives
i la souverainete des premikres nations
dominent les
affaires autochtones
canadiennes depuis fort longtemps.
L'ench~tssement de
l'autonomie
gouvernementale des autochtones dans la
constitution a subi un revers avec I'ichec
de l'Accord de Chartottetown en octobre
1992. Ilfaut cependant continuer b traiter
des problkmes quotidiens. Cet article
examine l'experience amricaine relative
aux accords intergouvernementaux
nggoci~s entre les tribus et les Etats
membres. Ces accords ont par exemple
permis de r~soudre les conflits de
compitence en matikre de taxation,
d'dlimination des dichets solides, et de
maintien de I'ordre public entre les
autoritisde l'tat et les autorits tribales.
L'auteur estime que
les accords
intergouvernementaux amiricains
fournissent un modkle utile b la resolution
des problkmes jvoqu~s ci-dessus, b la mise
en euvre de solutions pratiques et t
I 'expansion de I 'autonomie
gouvernementale des premi~res nationsau
Canada.

Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the excellent research assistance of William C. Hugenberg, Jr.,
University of Colorado School of Law Class of 1993. An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the Canadian Bar Association Program on "Constitutional
Entrenchment of Aboriginal Self-Govemment," Ottawa, Ontario, March 27, 1992.
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I.

Introduction

In the United States, intergovernmental agreements close the gap
between concepts of sovereignty and the necessities of governance. They
are used to give practical meaning to broad legal principles, to effectuate
court decisions and legislative delegations of authority, and to clarify
ambiguous laws. In some cases, agreements resolve disputes that would
otherwise be mired in costly, protracted, and sometimes inconclusive
litigation.
Intergovernmental agreements have become a device of necessity for
United States Indian tribes and their neighbouring governments. The
necessity stems from the legal complexity of the field of Indian law and
policy and the diversified land tenure situation on Indian reservations.
Recent litigation and assertions of sovereignty by revitalized tribal
governments have forced lingering issues to be resolved with practical
solutions.
Case law, treaties, and statutes have created a bizarre jurisdictional
arrangement. The question of which government has responsibility over
an infraction on any Indian reservation may turn on the ownership of the
land where it occurs, the race of the victim, the race and tribal affiliation
of the actor, and a determination of whether the law controlling the
behaviour is "prohibitory" or not. Jurisdiction to impose civil regulations
entails extensive and imprecise case-by-case analysis of the relative
interests of the state, federal and tribal governments. The fact that much,
and in some cases most, land on Indian reservations is owned by nonIndians compounds the problem. The situation creates bewildering
challenges to tribal and state officials charged with administering justice
and performing governmental responsibilities. Thus, current policies
ostensibly respecting Indian self-determination and the tribes'
governmental status are frustrated.
Intergovernmental relations with United States Indian tribes are further
defined by federal and state statutes enabling tribes to assume and exercise
powers of self-government, on proclamations of state governors
acknowledging a government-to-government relationship with tribes, and
1993
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on a mutual desire to arrange the conduct of governmental affairs between
states and tribes. In the first half of 1992, state legislatures in the United
Native
States considered 291 bills involving state relations with
Americans, of which, some 106 were enacted. Included among those that
were passed were authorizations for cooperative agreements between state
agencies and tribes in a variety of policy areas such as law enforcement,
hazardous and solid waste disposal, allocation of tax revenues, economic
development, and allocation of water rights.'
Because the day-to-day problems of governance in the context of federal
Indian law have become increasingly difficult, the governments involved
are turning less to the courts and to Congress and more to the negotiating
table. In the United States, the use of intergovernmental agreements to
give meaning to tribal sovereignty is a relatively recent phenomenon. It
has been successful as far as it has gone, though its potential has not been
fully realized. Much of the future of tribal relations lies with states and
local governments in the United States, however, and therefore the
practical meaning of tribal sovereignty will be written in intergovernmental
agreements. These agreements can be superior to litigation or to the
unilateral decisions of one sovereign's legislative body.
The thesis of this article is that the United States experience
demonstrates promise for intergovernmental agreements with tribes that
may be transferable to Canada. In the United States, intergovernmental
agreements with tribes have been used as remedial measures to cope with
murky or unworkable doctrines. In Canada, doctrine remains essentially
undeveloped. The United States' experience with intergovernmental
agreements -both successes and failures- can be relevant as Canadian
governments seek to clarify the self-governing powers of First Nations.
2
Native peoples in the United States and Canada are similar statistically

J. Reed, 1992 State Legislation Relating to Native Americans, State Legislative

Report, National Conference of State Legislatures 1 (1992) [forthcoming].
2

Native/Indian Population:
Tribes and Bands:

Canada

United States

2,000,000(1992)
633

1,960,996 (1990)
497
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and in their economic, social, and health concerns.3 However Indian
policies in the two countries have followed different traditions.4 While
United States' policy has vacillated between assimilation and isolation,
Canada has pursued the unwavering policy of assimilation.5 There is less
interaction by Aboriginal people with non-Indians than in the United
States, however. This is because of the relative isolation of many reserves
and the smaller numbers of non-Indians living within those reserves.
Consequently, Aboriginal people are, on balance, less assimilated in
Canada than in the United States.
United States law early recognized tribal sovereignty, but has varied its
definition through statutes and treaties that reflect the policies of their
respective eras. Tribes governing their territories have come into frequent
conflict with state and local governments. By contrast, "the centralization
of Indian management has created a much clearer doctrine of
Province/tribe relationships in Canada than has evolved in the United

Reservation Population:
309,000 (1990)
1,001,441
Birthrate:
2x Canada's
2x United States'
Funding to Reservations:
$3.5 billion
$3.5 billion
Per Capita Expenditures:
$11,264
$3,495
Treaties in Force:
11
370
Canadian data compiled from M.S. Serrill, "Struggling to be Themselves" Time,
9 November 1992 at 52; R.H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada 2d ed.
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1988); "Something
New Under Canada's Frozen North" The Economist, 4 January 1992 at 33; L.
Belsit, "Canada's Native Uprising" The Christian Science Monitor, 18 October
1990 at 10-11; and S. O'Brien, "The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal
Sovereignty, Economies, and Families" (1984) 53 Fordham L. Rev. 315 at 341.
(A total of 67 treaties were entered into with Indians in what is now Canada
between 1680 and 1929. See R.W. Johnson, "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of
Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians" (1991) 66 Wash. L. Rev.
643 at 666, n. 110, of which II remain in force.)
Data for the United States compiled from Indian Service Population and Labour
Force Estimates (Bureau of Indian Affairs, Jan. 1991), and relate BIA "Fact
Sheets;" and from Belsit and O'Brien, supra.
3
4
5

Ibid.
Johnson, supra note 2.
Bartlett, supra note 2 at 23.
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States. ''6 In short, Canada's Indian Act leaves most governance of
Aboriginal people to provincial law and standards.7 Since the mid-19th
century, Aboriginal governments have been supplanted by organizations
under the close supervision of government agents; most self-governing
Band councils are constituted in this
authority was suspended.8
framework. They have power to make by-laws in a realm similar to the
law-making of a rural municipality. Though the powers are subject to
being disallowed by the Minister of Indian Affairs, their full limits, under
a supportive Minister, have not been fully tested.
A 1983 Canadian government report recommended entrenchment of
Indian rights, including self-government, in the Constitution. 9 The report
anticipated negotiation of agreements with First Nations to spell out their
jurisdiction over a variety of subjects. The agreements were to implement
proposed national legislation to be enacted even before a constitutional
amendment was adopted. The legislation would remove provincial
authority over broad subject matter on reserves. The legislation was not
passed because activity since the report has largely concentrated on
pursuing an amendment to the Constitution Act.
Whether or not Canadians ultimately choose to entrench the sovereignty
of the First Nations in the Constitution, they face immediate pressure to
Because the
define the extent and effect of Indian sovereignty.
constitutional recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty was proposed only
6

R.N. Clinton, "The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries
of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs" (1989) 69 B.U.
L. Rev. 329 at 386.

7

Bartlett, supra note 2, is a leading source on the Indian Act.

The 1876 Act

consolidated prior Indian laws. (See S.C. 1876, c. 18.) The assimilation policy
reflected in the Act traces to the Civilization of Indian Tribes Act Prov. C.S.

1857, c. 26. The Indian Act has been amended and appears in its present form
at R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
8

R. Bartlett, "Indian Act of Canada" (1978) 27 Buff. L. Rev. 591 at 594-603.

9

Canada, House of Commons, The Special Committee on Indian Self-Government
Report of the Special
in Canada, "Indian Self-Government in Canada:
Committee" (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 12 October, 1983) (Chair: K. Penner) at
44.
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in general terms,' ° it would have had little practical meaning without
further interpretation by the courts, by Parliament, or by mutual
agreements. Thus, a constitutional amendment may have given a moral
and political boost to Native sovereignty, but it would not have resolved
issues of implementation. Further legislation or negotiated agreements
would be required in any event. The recent decision of Canadian citizens
not to pursue a proposed constitutional revision that included recognition
of First Nations' sovereignty' leaves First Nations and their neighbours
no less in need of practical approaches to governance. An obvious
approach would be to renew efforts to pass federal legislation curtailing
provincial jurisdiction over reserves and enabling First Nations to assume
it.12
However, some agreements with the federal and provincial
governments recognizing tribal authority over matters now within the
authority of each may be possible even without national legislation."
10 The referendum on which Canadians voted in November, 1992 was based on the

12

3

Charlottetown Accord (Consensus Report on the Constitution, August 28, 1992),
a 20 page document covering a variety of issues. At least one-third of the 60
items addressed in the Accord related directly to aboriginal peoples. Items 41-44
elaborate on the "inherent right of self-government." In addition to constitutional
entrenchment of an explicit recognition of this right, the proposal would have
delayed judicial interpretation of the provision for five years. Item 45-46
committed all governments to negotiate agreements implementing the right of
self-government, "including issues of jurisdiction, lands and resources, and
economic and fiscal arrangements."
See C. Trueheart, "Leaders Face Fallout From Canada Vote; Quebec Questions
Left Unresolved," Washington Post (28 October, 1992) A18.
There is growing recognition that the most effective approach to fuller
sovereignty is through "negotiated self-government." See I.B. Cowie, "Future
Issues of Jurisdiction and Coordination between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal
Governments" (Paper No. 13) in Aboriginal Issues and Constitutional Reform
(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1987).
Intergovernmental agreements are an integral element of Canadian federalism and
are encompassed within the rubric of "cooperative federalism." See P.W. Hogg,
ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1985) at
106-109. For example, one author asserts that the very nature of Canadian
federalism requires that regulatory proposals made by the National Energy Board
be preceded by intergovernmental agreements with the three major natural gas
producing provinces. See D.C. Steckler, "Toward the Integration of Canadian
and United States Natural Gas Import Policies" (1990) 25 Land & Water L. Rev.
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The conditions may now be right for employing intergovernmental
agreements to determine jurisdictional responsibilities between First
Nations and Canadian federal and provincial governments. Canada is at
a watershed in Aboriginal rights law and First Nations are moving
inexorably toward fulfilment of their sovereignty and land rights.
Professor Ralph Johnson observes that the Canadian Supreme Court's
decisions are tending toward "greater judicial protection of First Nations
and Aboriginal rights" which he characterizes as a "remarkable
turnaround."' 14 Perhaps the most important of all legal developments was
the inclusion of s. 35(1) in the 1982 Constitution Act by which all
"existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada
are recognized and affirmed."' 15 This effectively "constitutionalized"
Aboriginal rights making any involuntary extinguishment unlawful without
a constitutional amendment. 16 Professor Johnson discusses the extensive
Aboriginal claims to land that are being negotiated in recognition of these
Aboriginal rights "in a process with all the earmarks of earlier treaty
negotiations."' 7 This has resulted in several major recent settlements.

14

is
16

17

335 at 369.
R.W. Johnson, supra note 2 at 643, 675, 718. In Johnson's comparative analysis
of Native law in the United States and Canada, he traces a new judicial approach
in Canadian aboriginal rights beginning with the 1973 case of Calderv. Attorney
General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, aff.'g (1970) 74 W.W.R. 481
(B.C.), and culminating in Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. See
also M.D. Wells, "Sparrow and Lone Wolf: Honouring Tribal Rights in Canada
and the United States (1991) 66 Wash. L. Rev. 1119.
Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11, s. 35(1).
Johnson, supra note 2 at 683.
Ibid. at 681. See, for example, The Act Concerning Northern Villages and the
Kativik Regional Government of 1978, discussed by Cowie, supra note 12 at 3234; The Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act of 1984, S.C. 1984, c. 18, discussed by
Bartlett, supra note 2 at 32-35, and by Cowie, supra 12 at 30-31; the Sechelt
Indian Band Self-Government Act of 1986, S.C. 1986, c.27, discussed by Bartlett
supra at 33-35, and by Cowie, supra 12 at 31-32; the Dene/Metis Agreement in
Principle, described by J. Keeping, "Dene/Metis Agreement in Principle" (Winter
1989) 25 Resources: The Newsletter of the Canadian Institute of Resources Law
4; the Gwich'in Agreement of 1991, described by L. MacLachlan, "The Gwich'in
Final Agreement" (Fall 1991) 36 Resources: The Newsletter of the Canadian
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Taken together, recent legal developments create a base for substantial
future gains by First Nations.' 8 Furthermore, there appears to be
momentum building among First Nations to achieve those gains.
The constitutional debate, accompanied by recent legal activity by some
First Nations, especially land claims, has raised the consciousness of
Indians and non-Indians to the point that they may press for clarification
of many questions relating to administration of justice, regulation,
education, child welfare, services, and taxation on Indian reserves
throughout the country. Presumably, a host of issues were deferred until
the constitutional question could be decided.
The constitutional basis for self-government agreements was attractive
because it would acknowledge the principle that First Nations retain
inherent sovereignty. In the practical world of governance, however, it
may be more important to secure the prerogatives of self-government now
and defer the theoretical question of how much inherent sovereignty is
retained by First Nations. The question need not be specifically answered
before government responsibilities now exercised by the federal or
provincial governments are turned over to First Nations. 9

18

19

Institute of Resources Law 7; and the Inuit Settlement of 1992, described by
Serrill, supra note 2 at 52 and in "Canada's Unfinished Business" The Economist
(14 November 1992) at 48. As Cowie makes clear, these settlements include
explicit recognition of indigenous peoples' capacity for self-government,
including the authority to enact by-laws pertaining, for example, to zoning and
land use, public safety, health and hygiene, taxation, and a variety of other
municipal functions.
A less optimistic view of the state of aboriginal law in Canada is expressed in
P. Mecklem, "First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian
Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L. Rev. 82. (He identifies the laws of
property, sovereignty, treaties, and the constitution impediments to selfgovernment that must be reformed before true progress can be made).
I understand the argument that delegation of power from another government is
inferior to a recognition that those powers reside inherently with First Nations.
To be sure, there is a vigorous debate over whether aboriginal sovereignty of
First Nations survived European contact, and I respect the view that affirmance
of the inherent nature of aboriginal sovereignty should be a fundamental
objective of Native people in Canada. See M. Asch, "Aboriginal Self-
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If the Constitution Act is not amended in the foreseeable future,
governments at all levels may find it timely to pursue Aboriginal
governance issues through other means. Defining the limits of Aboriginal
sovereignty will send them to Parliament, to court, and ultimately to the
negotiating table. Negotiation has a potent role in an overall strategy for
perfecting First Nations sovereignty. It requires no party to surrender its
principles to the other; it enables practical allocations of governing
authority over vital issues on which parties are most likely to agree
20
without confronting the largely theoretical issues that separate them.
After a brief discussion of the nature of sovereignty, this paper reviews
the development of Indian law in the United States, then surveys examples
of the use of cooperative agreements between state or local governments
on the one hand and tribal governments on the other. The article
concludes with comments on how the device of negotiating
intergovernmental agreements can fit into a strategy of pursuing the
sovereign rights of Aboriginal people.
The utility of intergovernmental agreements for Canada and its provinces
should be at least as great as in the United States. Observations on
experiences in the United States are humbly offered in the hope that they
may be germane. Both nations strive for good, efficient government as
well as moral legitimacy for their policies and laws. It is the quest for

20

Government and the Construction of Canadian Constitutional Identity" (1992) 30
Alta L. Rev. 46. Yet I do not believe that explicit acknowledgment of inherency
needs to precede the important business of actual governance. At bottom, the
best acknowledgment of sovereignty comes through the practice and acceptance
of governance. Every agreement vesting a tribal government with specific
governing authority is an implicit recognition of its sovereignty. Indeed, a
"delegation" of governing authority to other than a sovereign seems anomalous
and may be illegal. Congress's delegation of authority over liquor regulation to
an Indian tribe was upheld by the United States Supreme Court because the tribe
was an independent government, while such delegation to a mere private,
voluntary organization would be unlawful. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544 (1975). See also Belsie, supra note 2.
See R.L. Jamieson, "The Aboriginal Fact: A New Opportunity for Canada"
(1991) 25 Law Society Gazette 81.
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grounding Indian policy in these principles that animated the exploration
of how to allocate sovereign power between tribes and neighbouring nonIndian governments. Judging the relevance of the ideas and legal tools
discussed in this paper, however, is left to the First Nations themselves and
to experts in Canadian law.
II.

Defining Sovereignty

Intergovernmental agreements can provide fuller, more precise
definitions of the authority of states and tribes by attaching practical
meaning to the abstract legal concept of sovereignty. As such, agreements
are both alternatives to and a component of other methods of defining
sovereignty that historically have included litigation, legislation (and
enforcement) by a more powerful government, treaties, and even war. The
results of each of these methods - even war -have required further legal
interpretation and articulation.
The idea that sovereigns must coexist is not novel. It is especially
challenging, though, where Aboriginal peoples have been surrounded and
effectively dominated by an immigrant society. Recognition and respect
for continuing sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples in this setting depends on
legal systems, first, to embody certain fundamental values and, second, to
recognize the advantages of self-determination.
The legal traditions of the United States and Canada incorporate ideals
of consent and participation. Both countries have struggled with how to
achieve the essential unity needed to satisfy the obligations of nationhood
while preserving the cultural diversity that gives individuals identity in a
large, multi-cultural nation. At times, it is difficult to ensure racial
equality without squelching ethnic pride, yet the countries of North
America are politically and legally committed to success.
The conundrum of assuring self-determination for Aboriginal people is
especially challenging. Its benefits and its moral importance are less
understood than comparable issues under the rubric of pluralism. When
the question is couched in terms of the rights of tribes as separate
sovereigns, it sometimes alienates people reared in a tradition of equal
1993
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rights. Sovereignty, however, is the ultimate "civil right." It is the
collective authority people concede to a government. The link between
cultural integrity as a basic right and achieving a level of self-governance
surely has been made in the debates over the appropriate level of
independence of ethnically identified Canadian provinces. This has
facilitated an understanding of the argument of First Nations for
recognition of their self-government.
The fact that Native American cultures have survived with such tenacity
is powerful evidence of the distinctiveness of tribal societies. For nearly
500 years, the insistent forces of European culture have pressed in on
Native peoples suggesting, coercing, legislating, and mandating change.
The remarkable resilience of Indian cultures enabled tribal peoples to
maintain their cultural integrity in spite of seemingly insuperable
influences to homogenize them with the larger society.
There is a quickening self-determination movement throughout the
world. An indigenous independence movement is especially apparent in
the Americas. The sophistication, and perhaps the conscience, of the
dominant governments of the Americas has grown, easing the repression
that historically made self-determination movements fruitless, if not
suicidal. The passing of some of the harshest regimes in Latin America
has lifted the heel of repression from indigenous groups whose past
survival was possible only through isolation. Groups in those countries are
now arguing out the components of their legal sovereignty with the
national governments that incorporate their territory.
The United States, where a modicum of inherent self-government of
tribes has always been recognized as the legal norm, has never settled what
self-government really means in terms of practical applications like mineral
severance taxes, land use zoning, pollution regulation, or adoptions of
children. Typically, these questions have been addressed in a jealous tugof-war for control of jurisdictional turf. They arise in the contexts of
emotionally or politically charged facts of a specific case. Legal principles
are announced and later tortured.
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In its healthiest incarnation, the debate over tribal sovereignty will be
resolved by determining an arrangement that produces effective
governance. That requires looking at whom and what are to be governed.
Which entity can make the most effective judgments about control of
particular people, land, and resources? Which entity will make and
enforce laws that will have the respect and allegiance of the people subject
to them? What resolution is most compatible with the moral and legal
traditions of the affected peoples? The famous legal scholar, Karl
Llewellyn, together with anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel wrote in their
21
landmark study, The Cheyenne Way:
The success of any legal system depends upon its acceptance by the people to whom
it applies.

Insofar as the system is an integrated part of the web of social norms

developed within a society's culture ... it will be accepted as a part of the habit-conduct
patterns of the social heritage of the people. The eternally primary functions of law in
any society being to close any breach which has opened between grievance-bearers, and
meanwhile to restrain individuals from the breach of certain norms of either initial
conduct or adjustment which are deemed of vital importance by the society concerned,
it follows in the main that the fewer the demands that are made upon the law, the
greater good for the society.

Ideally, then, the governmental decisions and activities that cut deepest
into the fibre of Indian culture should be left to Indian self-government.
Tribes have much to gain or lose in the allocation of recognized sovereign
powers. For instance, the future of their societies may depend on issues
like how freely Indian children can be adopted by families far away from
the reservation, or a tribe's ability to provide basic government services
may rise or fall on whether they can tax a coal mine on their reservation.
So too it is with other jurisdictional issues concerning control of water,
lands, fish and wildlife. Indian religion is profoundly implicated in many
of these decisions as well. The transcendent spiritual significance of land
and nature is affected by every mine and every dam, every barrel of toxic
waste laid in the ground, and every ton of SO 2 poured into the atmosphere.

21

K. Llewellyn & E. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way:

Conflict and Case law in

Primitive Jurisprudence(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941) at 239.
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Beyond legal, political, and economic concerns in allocating sovereign
prerogatives to tribes, the dominant society may be obliged to heed moral
forces that eschew crippling or exterminating another people's life-ways,
culture, health and religion. There is a benefit for all peoples, non-Indian
as well as Indian, in allowing Indian cultures to thrive. Just as we are
coming to appreciate that our biological survival is linked to maintaining
the diversity of species, we are learning that our cultural health may be
strengthened by sustaining cultural diversity. As a California state court
judge observed in one Indian case:
"The varying currents of the
subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth
22
and beauty.
III.

A History of Intergovernmental Tensions

United States' Indian policy is characterized by a three-way tension
among the federal government, the several states, and the tribes. Historical
roots of the tension predate the United States Constitution.
The
complicated jurisdictional situation in United States Indian law traces to
early judicial rationalizations used to explain the relationship of the tribes
to the United States government. Statutes, hundreds of treaties, and a host
of judicial decisions are based on a special relationship between tribes and
the federal government. These laws and decisions appear inconsistent with
one another but tend to track vacillations of public policy in the dominant
society.
The law has weaved together principles from threads spun by particular
cases or particular eras. Indian policy has, indeed, been schizophrenic,
sometimes pursuing assimilation of Indians, at other times favouring their
isolation. The first reservations effectively spared Indians from the melting
pot in a nation of immigrants, but other aspects of Indian policy, including
the establishment of later reservations, were designed to stir Indians into
the melting pot, assimilating them with the rest of the population.

22

People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716; 40 Cal. Rptr. 69; 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
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The allocation of authority over Indian affairs as between the states and
the national government was contentious from the start. After declaring
independence from England, the thirteen colonies organized under the
Article of Confederation. Under Article IX, the Congress had primary
authority over Indian affairs so long as it did not impinge upon or violate
23
the "legislative right of any state within its own limits.
One of the compromises that made possible the adoption of the United
States Constitution was resolution of this issue in favour of federal
supremacy. The Constitution of 1789 included a "commerce clause"
giving Congress exclusive authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes. 24 Since
another provision of the Constitution makes that instrument the supreme
law of the land, any state laws inconsistent with federal statutes, treaties
or the Constitution itself are overridden.25
The Constitution with its commerce clause assigned full responsibility
to Congress for the governance of Indian affairs.
United States
representatives negotiated treaties with tribes and set boundaries for
reservations. The federal government was to prevent violation of those
boundaries by non-Indians. The states continued to resist and generally
resent what they considered to be an incursion of federal authority into
their territory whenever federal control of Indian affairs seemed in conflict
with state goals. Often those goals were as simple and base as owning and
controlling lands possessed by the Indians. For states to take possession
or control of Indian lands without the participation of the federal
government was contrary to the general idea of the commerce clause of the

23

24
2

D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, FederalIndian Law, 2d ed. (1986) at 36. For a full
text of the Articles of Confederation see C.C. Tansill, Documents Illustrative of
the Formationof the Union of American States (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing, 1927) at 27-37.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 [emphasis added].
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Constitution (one of only two mentions of Indians in the entire
document 26). Even more specifically, state meddling in Indian affairs
also contradicted one of the earliest federal statutes. The Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790 demanded federal approval of the transfer of
Indian land to non-Indians and put other restrictions on trading with
Indians. 7
Conflicts over the integrity of Indian country as against state control in
the face of an apparently supreme federal power was typified by the early
attempts of the state of Georgia to exert authority over the lands and
resources of the Cherokees. Three famous cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court left no doubt about the primacy of federal law in
Indian affairs, at least as a legal formality. Two of the cases dealt with
attempts of Georgia to extend its laws over Cherokee territory. Another
declared invalid land titles that had been obtained directly from Indian
tribes without the participation of the United States government. The three
cases, in opinions by Chief Justice John Marshall known as the "Marshall
Trilogy," create the foundation of American Indian law. 28 These early
opinions of the Supreme Court defined the three-way relationship among
the federal government, the states, and the tribes but the decisions were to

26

27
28

The other provision is art. I, §2, cl. 3, which apportions legislative representation
and direct tenation among the states by population but excludes "Indians not
taxed." Because of subsequent legal developments, this phrase is essentially an
anachronism. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 ed.
(Charlottesville, Va.: Bobs-Merrill, 1982) at 388-389.
F. Cohen, supra note 26 at 110.
Johnson v. MacIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), explored the origins of
"Indian title" to land, defined the nature of that title, and reaffirmed the
requirement of federal participation in Indian title transfers. Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), denied the Cherokee Nation's ability to
bring suit in the courts of the United States as a foreign nation because it had
become a "domestic dependent nation" a government dependent on the United
States. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Court affirmed
the tribe's sovereignty, defining it as being extraterritorial to the state, and
holding that the laws of Georgia could have "no force" there, because to allow
them would conflict with the superior federal authority and therefore be
"repugnant to the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United SyXds.1, No. I
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mean more in terms of their long-term wisdom than their immediate
practical effect.
President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the decision in Worcester
v. Georgia, the most important of the three cases.2 9 Instead, Jackson
acceded to Georgia's desire to expel the Cherokees from their land and to
relocate them to different territory hundreds of miles away in what is now
Oklahoma. This removal policy marked the zenith of the isolationist
approach in Indian affairs. It represented a political concession to the
original states and, particularly as non-Indians were claiming most of the
lands and resources, a genuine inability to protect reservations from
outsiders.
Federal courts generally proclaim their adherence to the principles in
Worcester. There has certainly been some erosion and several departures
from the arrangement of sovereignties in that case but, as the Supreme
Court has reiterated, "the basic policy of Worcester has remained."3
Nevertheless, conflict has swirled around that basic policy. There is a
continuing dialectic between the Marshallian view and what Professor
Richard Collins calls the "Francisco Pizarro view" (after the vicious
conquistador who destroyed the Inca empire in the course of conquering
Peru) represented historically by Andrew Jackson's refusal to enforce the
Court-recognized dignity and autonomy of the Indian tribes.
The Worcester decision has been applied in a long line of cases that:
1) impose strict limits on the governmental authority of states within
Indian reservations; 2) recognize broad federal authority in Indian affairs;
3) assert commensurate federal responsibility for Indians; and 4) preserve
a realm of Indian tribal sovereignty." However, tensions persist.

29

30

31

See J.C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases, A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality
(1969) 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, (1959).
Worcester is one of the most cited of all U.S. Supreme cases, more so than all
but three pre-Civil War decisions. Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 23 at 51.
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The Supreme Court originally invoked Congress's legislative authority
under the commerce clause primarily to reinforce the exclusion of state
authority over Indians in enclaves where tribes were sovereign. As
conflicts with states became more frequent and a diminishing tribal land
base was increasingly threatened, Indian dependence on the federal
government grew. Several cases coupled the federal constitutional power
over Indian affairs with the apparent dependence of the tribes and read into
it expansive congressional powers. The Court said in 1886: "From [the
Indians'] very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it
promised, there arises a duty of protection, and with it the
has been
32
power.

Once asserted, the great power of the federal government was not always
beneficially used for Indians. The plenary power of Congress was used to
uphold federal legislation limiting tribal sovereignty by making certain
crimes punishable in federal court,33 and eventually by allowing Congress

to abrogate unilaterally Indian treaties with the United States.34 By using
federal legislation to curtail tribal sovereignty and to reduce tribal land
If greater
holdings, Congress increased the dependence of tribes.
provided
of
power
each
exercise
dependence gave rise to greater power,
the basis for even more power. Nevertheless, tribal governments survived
with substantial prerogatives intact.
Exercises of state power have continually come into conflict with tribal
self-government, calling into play early doctrines. In case after case, states
and municipal governments as subdivisions of the states, have stretched
to assert their governmental authority over Indians and their territory.
Repeatedly, courts have been called upon to adjust tribal-state relations,
usually laying down limits on state criminal jurisdiction, state taxing
power, state regulatory authority, and state court jurisdiction in Indian

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. (1886) at 384.
33 Ibid. (upholding the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
34 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
32
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country. Indians, in turn, have resisted.
One early decision characterized
35
state-tribal relations as follows:
These Indian Tribes are wards of the nation.., they owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill-feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.

A series of modern cases in the United States Supreme Court have
reiterated the basic principles of the Marshall Trilogy, whittling away at
them in a few situations, particularly where non-Indians are involved. The
modern cases, when taken as a whole, are largely respectful of Indian selfgovernment.36
As Indian tribes won successive victories insulating their reservations
from state authority, they began enacting their own legislation to deal with
taxation and regulatory issues as well as criminal jurisdiction. They
sometimes imposed these laws over all people and property within their
reservations. Individual non-Indians and companies owned by non-Indians
located on reservations resisted the imposition of tribal jurisdiction. NonIndian complaints about tribal jurisdiction fell on increasingly sympathetic
ears in the Supreme Court, which often seized on the land tenure situation
on many reservations as a reason to curb the exercise of tribal power.
Non-Indian ownership and population of reservation land trace to nowdiscredited policies that were designed to eliminate the reservation system
and tribal governments. Near the turn of the century, reservation lands held
by the tribes were carved up into allotments-parcels of 160 or 320 acres

35

United States v. Kagama, supra note 32 at 383-84.

36

The jurisprudence of modem Indian law is masterfully traced by C.F. Wilkinson
in American Indians, Time and the Law: Native Societies in a Modem
Constitional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). The
"modem era" described by Professor Wilkinson began in the 1960s. The Court's
solicitude for tribes and their governments, however, seems to have waned with
changes in Court membership. Cases since the early 1980s have shown at best
confusion and at worst retreat from precedent, suggesting that the modem era has
ended.
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that were conveyed to individual Indians.37 The government then
believed it was appropriate to convert Indians, who in many cases lived off
the land as hunters, into farmers. By making pastoral people of them and
confining them to smaller tracts, there would be surplus land that could be
distributed as homesteads to non-Indians. Today, on many Indian
reservations there are large non-Indian populations as a result of
government homestead programs that opened "surplus" lands on the
reservations to non-Indians. On some reservations, most of the land is
owned by non-Indians.
Furthermore, after a period during which the allotments were held in
"trust" for the Indians by the government, those lands became alienable by
the Indians. Allotted lands were then transferred to non-Indians by
individual Indians who were inveigled to sell or whose lands were taken
from them for unpaid taxes or debts. Although the Allotment Act was
repealed in 1934 as a part of the Indian ReorganizationAct, it accounts for
about 100 million acres changing hands from Indians to non-Indians.38
Land tenure on reservations is in a checkerboard pattern. Non-Indian
owned parcels are scattered among Indian lands. Many non-Indian owners
consider it unfair or improper to subject them to laws made by the Indian
tribes. Responding to their concerns, the modem United States Supreme
Court has denied Indian tribes the authority to arrest and punish nonIndians who commit crimes within the reservation.39 In a remarkable
recent decision, that precedent was extended even to non-member
Indians. 40 Thus, tribes also now lack jurisdiction to arrest, try, and
punish Indians who are members of another tribe for crimes they commit
37

See D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands ed. by F.P.

38

Prucha (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).
See Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d

39
40

Cong., 2d Sess. 16-18 (1934). Commissioner
concluded that over 90 million acres were lost to
owing to Allotment Act programs and policies.
were the best, resulting in a loss of 80 percent
Indians in 1887.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 435 U.S.
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).

of Indian Affairs John Collier
Indians between 1887 and 1934
He contends that the lands lost
of the land value belonging to
191 (1978).
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on reservations. Thousands of Indians are on reservations other than their
own as a result of intermarriage, employment opportunities, or intertribal
ceremonial, social, and business activities. Under the decision, they would
be subject to state laws for most crimes. Because Congress long ago
enacted special laws making all Indians (not just tribal members) subject
to federal laws concerning certain crimes on the reservation, 41 these nonmember Indians would be subject to federal jurisdiction for major crimes
and crimes against non-Indian but would escape prosecution for crimes
against other Indians.42 Congress quickly acted to mend this tear in the
jurisdictional fabric by restoring the tribal jurisdiction over non-members
that the Court had removed.43
The spread of non-Indian landholdings on reservations has created
complications in the area of civil regulatory jurisdiction. The complexity
of the jurisdictional scheme over Indian country in the United States arises
from the Court's struggle with the application of what it has called "two
independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory
authority over tribal reservations and members." 44 Those two barriers
are: 1) preemption (the supremacy of federal law in Indian affairs over
state law); and 2) tribal self-government (where it would cause interference
with tribal sovereignty, application of state laws is precluded).
The preemption analysis is informed by tribal sovereignty notions
because federal laws are often vague or silent on jurisdiction. Thus, a
treaty that creates an Indian reservation is considered a federal law
intended to secure a traditionally self-governing enclave against intrusions
41
42

Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1152.
The Indian Country CrimesAct specifically excepts crimes by one Indian against

another.

In absence of federal legislation, crimes among Indians are solely

within tribal jurisdiction. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).

Duro v.

Reina, supra note 40 found tribes lacked this jurisdiction over non-member
Indians.
43 A temporary measure was hastily enacted to restore tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Public Law 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (Nov. 5, 1990). It was
made permanent in 1991. Public Law 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (Oct. 28, 1991).
44

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, (1980) at 142.
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by states. As to Indians, then, reservation status may end the inquiry:
state jurisdiction is excluded.45
Reservation status alone is not sufficient to bar application of state law
to non-Indians since "self-government" is not automatically involved.
Instead, the courts make a "particularized inquiry" into the relative interests
of the respective governments. The question is whether, on balance, tribal
self-government would be infringed by the imposition of state law.4 6
Because federal interests are considered, the court asks whether the
imposition of state law offends some federal law or policy with respect to
Indians. If so, the latter interests may tilt the scales against applying state
law to non-Indians on a reservation. In a number of cases this analysis has
barred state taxation and regulation of non-Indians based largely on various
federal Indian policies. In one case, state taxes on a non-Indian company
with whom a tribe had contracted to carry out logging operations in the
tribal forest were precluded.47 The Court found that the federal
government had enacted a regulatory scheme concerning harvesting and
sale of tribal timber which gave it a strong interest while the state's
interest was merely in raising revenue. The Court was also influenced by
the fact that the economic burden of the taxes would fall on the tribe
giving it an interest in resisting the taxes.
The other side of the jurisdictional coin is the ambit of tribal
jurisdiction. To the extent state jurisdiction is precluded, tribal jurisdiction
should be able to flourish, though the Court has not reasoned that tribal
jurisdiction applies wherever state jurisdiction does not. Several recent
challenges were incited as reinvigorated tribal governments imposed their
regulations over non-Indians on the reservation. The Supreme Court has
recognized the sovereign authority of tribes, holding that tribes generally
can regulate or tax non-Indian activity on Indian-owned reservation lands

45
46

47

See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Conn'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) at 172.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra note 44 at 145.
Ibid. at 150. See also CentralMachiner Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448
U.S. 160 (1980); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico,

458 U.S. 408 (1989).
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(owned by a tribe or an individual Indian).48 The imposition of a tribal
tax, however, may or may not preclude a state tax on the same subject.
The outcome depends on a consideration of governmental interests and at
times both sets of laws may apply.49
In cases when a non-Indian is on land owned in fee by a non-Indian, the
Court has developed a special test for tribal jurisdiction. It holds that the
tribe has no regulatory authority unless it can show that these nonmembers have entered into "consensual relations with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other
arrangements," or if it can demonstrate that the exercise of "civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation...
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."5 ° Needless to say, this
latter Supreme Court test (the so-called "Montana test") for when tribal
civil jurisdiction can be applied to non-Indians adds another level of
uncertainty calling for case-by-case litigation. Indeed, there has been
considerable litigation, but the Supreme Court has yet to find the Montana
test satisfied sufficiently to allow tribal jurisdiction except where
contractual or consensual relations were involved.5
The difficulties of applying the special laws concerning Indian
jurisdiction in the United States should be apparent from this brief review.
Congress has legislated piecemeal and the Court has elaborated law that
leaves little certainty, especially where non-Indian activity or property is
involved.

48

49
50
51

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
Montana v. United States, 450 U S. 544 (1981) at 565-66.
See e.g., Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, supra note 48; Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
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A complex, and at times bizarre, set of rules has emerged leading some
scholars to call Indian criminal jurisdiction a "maze ' 52 and a "crazyquilt."5 3 Consider the consequences. Indians on a reservation are subject
to federal law when they commit a major crime or a crime against a nonIndian. They are subject to tribal law in other cases. Non-Indians are
subject to federal law only when the crime is against an Indian and
otherwise are subject to state law. An Indian who is not a member of the
tribe of a particular reservation is subject to federal law for major crimes,
state law if the victim is a non-Indian, but escapes criminal prosecution if
the victim is a member of the tribe whose reservation it is.
The civil area is more complicated. The complications have grown out
of a judicial concern for the presence of large numbers of non-Indians and
non-Indian property within reservations. In the area of regulation and
taxation, tribes control activities and property of Indians. However, in the
case of non-Indian activities and property, the outcome depends on a
variety of factors. Because the Court has demanded a "particularized
inquiry" and a balancing of tribal, state, and federal interests, there is
uncertainty that can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis in absence
of some negotiated arrangement. Thus, courts have held that tribes can tax
oil production by non-Indians on reservation land, but the tribe cannot
restrict non-members fishing on fee land within the reservation. States
cannot tax gasoline sold to a non-Indian timber contractor who works on
tribal land and whose trucks use state highways, but states can tax the sale
of cigarettes to non-Indians by an Indian-owned store on the reservation
and so may the tribe.
The legal morass created by Indian jurisdiction decisions has reached the
point of the ridiculous. Particularly absurd results were reached in the
Supreme Court's decision in a recent case involving land use regulation on

52

R.N. Clinton, "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through A

53

Jurisdictional Maze" (1977) 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503.
T. Vollmann, "Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and
Defendants' Rights in Conflict" (1974) 22 U Kan. L. Rev. 387, n.l.
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the Yakima Reservation in the state of Washington.54 A divided Court
decided that state and local zoning laws applied to non-Indian lands on one
part of the reservation while tribal zoning laws applied to non-Indian lands
on another part of the reservation. To be effective, zoning schemes must
extend over an area of sufficient size and contiguity. The consistency and
comprehensiveness needed for successful land use planning and regulation
is defeated if regulatory authority depends on the ownership of particular
parcels of property. The situation becomes even more unworkable when
the rule is different for different parts of the reservation. In the Yakima
case, there were three different opinions, no one of which had a majority
of the Court's members signing it. The result does not seem consistent
with the Court's own precedents in the field.
Neither tribes nor states gain much satisfaction from decisions like the
one in the Yakima land use case. That case portends that litigation before
today's Court is likely to produce further confusion. Tests and principles
are announced only to be followed with exceptions or another rule. Even
the "rules" tend to require case-by-case analysis of each situation, and this
requires a look at highly variable demographic facts produced by a mix of
past policies and historical accidents. Fulfilment of present goals of
reservation and neighbouring communities is rarely achieved by the
superimposition of legal rules, especially rules as incoherent as those that
have emerged in the area of Indian country jurisdiction. The resulting
uncertainty leaves tribes, state governments, and local governments to act
at their peril, not knowing whether assertions of jurisdiction will be upheld
or not.
IV.

Intergovernmental Agreements With U.S. Indian Tribes

Negotiated arrangements among governments concerning jurisdiction and
the provision of government services on Indian reservations can give
certainty and avoid the necessity of litigation. Thus, they have become
especially attractive to all levels of government in the United States. Not

5

Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
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only do all parties save litigation costs, but they can tailor the results to fit
practical needs. The results of "successful" litigation typically provide
rules applicable to the particular case. However, even in an individual
case, the announced "rules" may not create a workable jurisdictional
scheme. The court decision may have to be followed by negotiations to
develop a practical way to apply (or avoid) the rules.
Another reason for pursuing intergovernmental agreements is that recent
federal legislation calls for tribes and states to negotiate the allocation of
certain governing authority between them. For instance, the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978"5 vests tribes with primary jurisdiction over children
of its members in adoption, foster care, and custody proceedings. It grants
authority to states and tribes to negotiate agreements or compacts
concerning jurisdiction over Indian child welfare proceedings. 56 The
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 19885' requires states to negotiate
compacts with tribes concerning the regulation of gaming activities on
More than 20 tribes and eight states have
Indian reservations.58
negotiated gaming compacts under the Act. Negotiations are underway in
other states.59
A 1953 law allows Indian tribes to regulate the introduction of liquor
into Indian country so long as they have the approval of the Secretary of
Interior and state laws are not violated. 6' The stipulation that state laws
not be violated has led to conflict and litigation over the shared
responsibilities of state and tribal governments in regulating liquor sales
in Indian country.6 ' Surely this area is ripe for negotiation though the
statute does not specifically authorize state-tribal agreements.

55

25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.

56

25 U.S.C. § 1919.
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(D)(iii)(I)(3)(A).

57
58
59
60
61

Governor (of New Mexico) Bruce King, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs, March 18, 1992.
18 U.S.C. § 1154; see United States v. Mazurie, supra note 19.
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
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The federal government also now routinely delegates some of its
authority and functions in providing services to tribes through contracts.
Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975,62 tribes regularly contract to conduct programs and provide service
within their own reservations that were formerly carried out by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. There are now many Indian-controlled schools on
reservations as well as tribal agencies performing a variety of services.
Functions like road maintenance and education often interface with state
and local government activities. Agreements for sharing responsibilities
with these governments can lead to greater efficiency and better services.
Such agreements are rare, however, and are not apparently encouraged by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Neither federal permission nor federal approval is generally required for
interjurisdictional agreements. There are some circumstances, however,
where federal participation is necessary. If more than one state is
involved, the United States Constitution may require congressional
approval. Congress must consent to interstate compacts even if the United
States is not itself a party.63 The federal government also must
participate in any contractual arrangement that attempts to alienate Indian
property or other Indian rights that are generally subject to restraints on
alienation. Absent a statute delegating approval authority to the Secretary
of Interior, congressional approval is necessary for any such agreement.'
Though federal sanction is not strictly necessary, Congress has
considered a "Tribal-State Compact Act," that would give statutory
authority and encouragement to states and tribes to enter into voluntary
interjurisdictional arrangements. 6' The subject matter of the proposed

62

25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n.

63

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
See Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also statutes granting
contractual approval authority, 25 U.S.C. § 71.
On several occasions bills were introduced for such an Act. See legislative
history summarized in 1977-78 Congressional Index, 95th Congress (CCH) S.
2502, §§ 14,261 and 20,515; 1979-80 Congressional Index, 96th Congress (CCH)

64
65
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legislation included enforcement or application of civil, criminal or
regulatory laws within the respective jurisdictions of the parties, allocation
or determination of governmental jurisdiction by subject matter or
geographic area, concurrent jurisdiction between states and tribes, and
procedures for the transfer of individual court cases between state and
tribal courts.66 In addition to enabling allocation of jurisdiction between

tribes and states, the Act would have exempted parties from any limiting
effects of Public Law 280 (a federal law that gives some states certain67
jurisdiction over criminal and civil adjudications in Indian country).
The bill provided that tribal members (not just the tribal council) must vote
to approve any agreement extending for more than five years. It also
encouraged the creation of local planning and monitoring boards to oversee
agreements and to promote their more effective use. Federal funds would
have been authorized to encourage and facilitate agreements that would
ultimately save federal money.
Although the proposed Tribal-State Compact Act was favoured by the
Department of Interior and the Department of Justice, it was not enacted.
One reason for the Act's defeat was a perception by tribes that it was a
vehicle for state encroachment on tribal sovereignty.68 Senator Slade
Gorton of Washington and some states also objected because the bill
would not have provided for the consent of non-Indians living on
reservations but only required Indian approval. Philip S. Deloira, director
of the Indian Law Center at the University of New Mexico School of Law,
believes that the tribes were fortunate that the Act did not pass into law

66
67

68

S. 1181, §§ 14,201 and 20,505; 1981-82 Congressional Index, 97th Congress
(CCH) S. 563, §§ 14,171 and 21,005.
See S. 563, supra note 65 § 101.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (civil
jurisdiction). See generally, C.E. Goldberg, "Public Law 280: The Limits of
State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians" (1975) 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535.
See testimony of James F. Canan, reprinted in Mutual Agreements and Compacts
Respecting Jurisdiction and Governmental Operations: Hearing Before the
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Sen., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., May 11,
1981.
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because it would have imposed procedural limitations on the exercise of
tribal sovereignty.69
Several states have enacted enabling legislation for negotiation and
execution of agreements with tribes. Absent some particular aspect of
state law that would make such legislation necessary, states appear to have
the power to negotiate such agreements whether or not they are
specifically authorized by state legislation. Nevertheless, the enactment of
such legislation tends to encourage cooperation by a variety of state
government agencies that otherwise might be recalcitrant or reluctant to
negotiate.
States that have passed enabling acts for state-tribal cooperative
agreements have produced generally positive results. The Montana act is
simply a policy statement encouraging cooperation between the state and
tribes.7 ° Nevertheless, in the opinion of lawyers working on Indian
reservations in that state, it has been useful in several situations.7 In one
case, there was a dispute over the ownership of state-owned section of land
located within the boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation of the
Salish and Kootenai Tribes. An agreement negotiated between the state
and the tribes provides for joint state and tribal licensing of off-reservation
use of the water without either party relinquishing its claims. In another
case, the tribes reached an agreement with the state fish and game
department recognizing tribal jurisdiction over hunting on trust lands and
Indian-owned allotments within the reservation and state jurisdiction over
hunting on non-Indian owned allotments within the reservation. The state
also agreed to pay all revenue derived from on-reservation license fees and
fines to the tribe to support a reservation-wide wildlife management
program.

69
70

71

Interview with Philip S. Deloria, March, 1992.
Mont. Code Ann. § 18-11-101.
Interview with John Carter, Attorney, Legal Services Office of the Flathead
Indian Reservation, March, 1992.
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The Nebraska State-Tribal Cooperative Agreements Act of 1989 is
similar to the Montana law but specifically authorizes state agencies to
perform any service or activity of any other public agency or of the tribal
governments entering into the compact.72 The Nebraska statute was
motivated by the refusal of state officials to place incorrigible delinquents
and chronic mental health patients from Indian reservations into state
facilities on the grounds that they lacked authority to provide such services
with other sovereign entities.73
Though its implementation has been stalled in some respects because of
disputes over interpretation of statutory language, the Nebraska Act has
been useful in some circumstances. For instance, the state social services
agency has reached agreements with the Winnebago and Omaha Tribes to
make payments to them under Title IV of the Federal Social Security
Act 74 (providing for child abuse and foster care programs).7 5 The state
Game and Parks Department has also reached agreement with the Nebraska
tribes on allocating hunting and fishing regulatory responsibilities and
recognizing tribal regulations on trust lands. In return, the tribes recognize
state regulation on non-Indian fee lands. The Winnebago and Omaha
Tribes have joined in an agreement among several northeast Nebraska
counties for the general operation of a juvenile holding facility.

72.

73.

74.
75.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-1501.
Interview with James Botsford, Esq., former Director, Legal Aid Society,
Walthill, Nebraska March, 1992.
42 U.S.C. § 601-687 (West 1991).
Interview with Deborah Brownyard, Esq., Director, Legal Aid Society, Walthill,
Nebraska, March, 1992.
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State-tribal cooperation has also been encouraged by proclamations of
governors of some states, announcing that the state would deal with Indian
tribes directly on a government-to-government basis.76 The Governors
of Arizona, New Mexico and Utah, along with the President of the Navajo
Nation which has lands in each of the three states, recently co-signed a
77
"Statement on Government to Government Policy."

76.

Wisconsin was one of the first to promote tribal state cooperation by Wis.

Executive Order #31 (13 October 1983). Washington Governor Booth Gardner
signed the "Centennial Accord" of 1989. South Dakota announced a "Year of
Reconciliation" by Executive Proclamation in 1990. Oregon recognized
intergovernmental relationships between tribes and states by executive
proclamation on April 10, 1990. See F. Pommersheim, "Tribal-State Relations:
Hope for the Future?" (1991) 36 S.D. L. Rev. 239 at 262-65 and 265 n. 181.
77- Statement of Government-To-Government Policy Navajo Nation, Arizona, New
Mexico and Utah:
There are mutual issues which face the parties hereto
concerning both Navajo and non-Navajo citizens living within
Navajo Nation and State jurisdictions, and the parties recognize
and agree that a procedure setting out a cooperative joint effort
shall be coordinated to address these mutual issues; and
The Navajo People are citizens of the Navajo Nation as well
as the State of Arizona, the State of Utah, or the State of New
Mexico and possess all the privileges and rights afforded
citizens of these States, are entitled to the same services and
benefits afforded by these states to their citizens, consistent
with law; and
Because of the sovereign status of the Navajo Nation and its
geographical location in three (3) states, the States and the
Navajo Nation have taken adverse positions over issues such
as taxation, water rights, state services to the Navajo people,
and where the extent of jurisdiction of the parties are not
clearly or judicially defined; and
Coordination and cooperation between the parties will
improve the delivery of services to all people within the
respective jurisdictions.
It is hereby agreed by the President of the Navajo Nation,
The Governor of the State of Arizona, the Governor of the
State of New Mexico and the Governor of the State of Utah
that:
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The subject matter of tribal intergovernmental agreements is wideranging. A 1981 survey by the Commission on State-Tribal Relations
documented such agreements in thirty topical areas. Some of the most
wildlife management,
active areas for such agreements were:
environmental protection, education, social services, taxation and law

The interactions of the State of Arizona, the State of Utah,
and the State of New Mexico with the Navajo Nation shall be
predicated on a government-to-government relationship.
The relationship will be carried forward in a spirit of
cooperation, coordination, communication and goodwill.
The parties hereto agree to meet together on a regular basis
to insure that the intent of this Statement is carried out.
Issues of mutual concern to the respective governments shall
be addressed through the following structure;
A. Initial contact and negotiations shall be conducted by the
appropriate Division or Department of the Navajo Nation and
the State;
B. The President and each Governor will designate an
individual to their staff with whom the Divisions and
Departments will consult as needed;
C. The President and the Governors shall be kept informed
of issues of potential conflict by their designated staff person
and shall provide such direction as necessary to resolve those
conflicts as early as possible;
D. The Attorney General of the Navajo Nation and the
Attorneys General of the respective states will consult with one
another, prior to the filing of any litigation or adverse claim
involving the Navajo Nation and the respective state
governments as opposing parties.
The parties hereto shall do all things necessary and proper to
inform and direct their respective governments to implement
the provisions and intent of this Statement.
Executed, this 6th day of January, 1992.
Bruce King, Governor of New Mexico; Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona;
Norman H. Bangerter, Governor of Utah; Peterson Zah, President, The Navajo
Nation.
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enforcement."8 A more recent survey documents 99 agreements covering
these areas, as well as other jurisdictional and public services issues.79
A. Hunting and Fishing
A pioneering intergovernmental agreement was reached between the
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and the State of Minnesota after
the tribe won a major court victory affirming its right to hunt, fish and
gather wild rice in its reservation. The agreement was incorporated in the
court's decree and subsequently ratified by the Minnesota state
legislature.8 ° In the agreement, the state acknowledged what the court
had already said: that the Indians were free of all state regulation while
hunting, fishing, trapping or gathering wild rice on the reservation. The
tribe agreed to prohibit commercial taking of game, fish, or rice and to
adopt a conservation code. The agreement also went farther and covered
hunting, fishing and rice gathering by non-Indians.8 In lieu of a tribal
licensing program, the state charged an additional fee imposed by the tribal
council to non-tribal members seeking to hunt on the reservation. The
special fee was rebated to the tribe for use in the support of resource
management. As discussed above, both Montana and Nebraska reached
accords on game and fish regulation and the revenue derived from the
Similar cooperative agreements have been
licensing of those activities.
82
states.
other
in
negotiated

78

7
80.
81.
82.

Commission

on State-Tribal

Relations,

State Tribal Agreements:

A

Comprehensive Study (1981).
Pommersheim, supra note 76 at 66.
See Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (Minn.
1971); Minn. Stat. § 97.431.
Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 23 at 729.
Colorado (Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes); Minnesota (Grand
Portage Band of Chippewas); Montana (Fort Belknap Community Council and
Fort Peck Indian Tribes); Oregon and Washington (Nez Perce, Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation, and Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation);
South Dakota (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe); Washington (Hoh and Quinault
Tribes, the Nisqually Tribe and the Port Gamble Klallam, Skokomish and
Suquamish Tribes); and Wisconsin (Winnebago Tribe). Getches & Wilkinson,
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B. Law Enforcement

Where substantial non-Indian communities have grown up within a
reservation, the problem of law enforcement can raise practical difficulties
State,
and create hostilities that impede effective law enforcement.
municipal, and tribal authorities are especially interested in the problem of
criminal arrest jurisdiction within Indian country. Even reservations with
small non-Indian populations may have highways passing through them
where traffic law enforcement is a problem.
One device to deal with the problem of overlapping law enforcement
jurisdiction is cross-deputization by mutual agreement. This allows the
police of either sovereign to arrest both Indians and non-Indians for
violating the law of either the tribe or the state. The state of New Mexico
The statute authorizes
has codified the process for cross-deputization.
officers who meet
or
tribal
pueblo
deputize
police
to
the chief of the state
statutory criteria if the pueblo or the tribe can show proof of sufficient
liability and property insurance.
In addition to cross-deputization, state and tribal courts have also
reached agreements on subjects such as service of process, full faith and
credit for judgments, and extradition from one jurisdiction to another.84
Some local law enforcement authorities have gained respect for the
fairness of tribal courts, but it has taken a long time for many of them to
overcome a racist reaction to the idea of Indian justice systems.

83.
84.

supra note 23 at 730.
N.M. Rev. Stat. § 29-1-11. See Ryder v. State, 648 P.2d 774 (N.M. 1982).
0. Olney & D. Getches, Indian Courts and the Future, Report of the National
American Indian Court Judges Association Long Range Planning Project
(Washington: National American Indian Court Judges Association, 1978).
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C. Zoning and Land Use Regulation
The Supreme Court's decision in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,85 concerning zoning authority on the
Yakima Reservation is discussed supra. The Court decided that there were
different allocations of responsibility over zoning in two parts of the same
reservation. Applications of the Court's decision is difficult on the
Yakima reservation and virtually impossible on others. This creates a
strong motivation for counties and their Indian neighbours to reach
intergovernmental agreements on land use control. Without collaboration
between the two governments, effective comprehensive land and resource
use regulation is defeated.
Before Brendale, the Swinomish Tribe and Skagit County in Washington
were already working toward coordinating land use planning in and around
the Swinomish Reservation. On the Reservation 46% of the land is owned
by non-Indians and 20% of the Indian trust land is leased to non-Indians
for their use. 86 The foundation for the Swinomish-Skagit County
cooperative process was a memorandum of understanding signed in 1987
that established a procedural framework to allow subsequent negotiations.
The memorandum did not actually allocate jurisdiction; it was essentially
an "agreement to agree" in that it was non-binding. Yet, it quelled
concerns of both governments with an express disclaimer of any intention
to "limit or waive the regulatory authority or jurisdiction of either party."
Agreements about land use can focus on the needs of specific sites. The
Tulalip Tribe and San Juan County, Washington have an agreement
concerning the use of Barlow Bay on Lopez Island where the tribe
purchased four acres for use as a seasonal fishing camp.87 The tribe, with

.
86.

87.

Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, supra

note 54.
S. Solomon & N. Zaferatos, "Cooperation Between the Swinomish Tribe and
Skagit County on Zoning," Proceedings of the Second Annual Western Regional
Indian Law Symposium (September 1988) Univ. of Wa. Sch. of Law 175.
Gover, Stetson & Williams, P.C. "Tribal-State Dispute Resolution - Recent
Attempts" (1991) 36 S.D. L. Rev. 277 at 296.
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little land of its own and substantial treaty fishing rights adjudicated by the
federal courts, needed the fishing camp so its members could exercise
treaty rights. After purchasing the land the tribe applied to the federal
government and requested the Bureau of Indian Affairs to accept the land
in trust under the Indian ReorganizationAct. 88 The effect of putting land
in trust was to exempt it from taxation by local governments and to make
it non-alienable without the agreement of the federal government. It is
treated essentially as part of the Indian reservation and therefore no local
regulation is applicable. San Juan County objected, fearing inappropriate
use of the land by the tribe.
After the tribe and the county began negotiating, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs deferred ruling on the application to take land in trust, advising
both parties that it would prefer to base the decision on a negotiated
agreement. The county finally withdrew its objection to trust status when
the tribe agreed to abide by various county regulations and to pay the
equivalent of the property taxes that would be lost in consideration of
services provided by the county.
D. Environmental Regulation
As with land use, environmental regulation needs to be administered
comprehensively. Ideally, it should be based on standards that extend over
a large area and not be inhibited by the existence of interlocking or
That is one reason the federal
overlapping political boundaries.
government enacted a system of national environmental statutes. Federal
laws concerning air pollution, water pollution, toxic chemicals and disposal
of hazardous waste maintain uniform standards throughout all the states.
In deference to a strong tradition of federalism in the country, almost all
of those statutes provided for the states to administer programs to
implement the national standards within their boundaries. This provision
for state "primacy" depends on states satisfying certain requirements for
program funding and demonstrating competence to administer the laws.

88.

See 25 U.S.C. § 465.
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Virtually all the federal pollution control acts now provide that Indian
tribes are to be treated as states and under most of these laws tribes may
assume primacy within their territory. 89 At least one major environmental
statute, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, does not specifically mention Indian
tribes. 90 Nevertheless, commentators have concluded that delegation of
authority by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to tribes under
the Act would be upheld in court. Analogous cases suggest that result. 91
In 1991, EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly, announced a policy for
implementing tribal primacy under the federal pollution statutes stating that
"consistent with the EPA Indian policy and interests of administrative
clarity, the Agency will view Indian reservations as single administrative
units for regulatory purposes."92 In accordance with this common sense
principle of territorial integrity, EPA has adopted regulations concerning
the implementation of water quality standards on Indian reservations. 93
The new regulations indicate that a single government should have
jurisdiction over the reservation. Unless and until a tribe applies for and
receives approval according to the conditions in the regulations for
assuming primacy within the reservation, the EPA will retain regulatory
jurisdiction over that geographic area of the state. Once primacy is
granted, the tribe will have complete jurisdiction and no portion of the
reservation will fall under state jurisdiction. Only if the tribe and the state
enter into consensual, cooperative agreements will state environmental

89.

E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1377, at 1377(e); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26, at 300j-11 (added by 1986 Amendment);
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, at

136u; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 at § 7474(c) and (e);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(Superfund), 42 U S.C. §§ 9601-9657, at § 9626 (added by 1986 Amendment).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i).
91 D. Getches, "Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to
Pragmatism" (1988) 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 515 at 535-36; see Nance v. EPA, 645
F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
92.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal,Tribal, and State Roles
in the Protection and Regulation of Reservation Environments, signed and
distributed by EPA Administrator William Reilly, July 10, 1991.
9'- 52 Fed. Reg. 64876 (Dec. 12, 1991).
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regulatory authority extend onto the reservation. This provides a special
incentive for states to pursue negotiated agreements where their interests
are strong.
Prior to the new EPA policy clarifying the government's approach to
granting primacy, some agreements had been reached between tribes and
states concerning the administration of environmental laws.
The
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe agreed with the state of Idaho that the tribe
would regulate air quality on Indian lands while the state would administer
it on fee lands. This agreement avoided a fight but did little to advance
the sound administration of the law. Perhaps the EPA policy described
above will remedy such problems.
Several areas of environmental regulation are not covered by federal
statutes. In these cases, the jurisdictional ambiguities created by federal
Indian law loom large, particularly as to non-Indian activities and lands
within reservations. One of the most troubling areas is solid waste
disposal. The federal Solid Waste Disposal Act deals primarily with
hazardous wastes. It includes only limited provisions covering ordinary
(non-hazardous) waste dumps.
Indian reservations are increasingly targeted as sites for waste disposal.
This has heightened interest in negotiated agreements between states and
tribes to resolve questions concerning solid waste management. In some
cases, tribes seek to use their inherent sovereignty over their reservations
to regulate such facilities on the reservation. Under no circumstances can
they be forced by state or local governments to locate dumps on their own
lands. However, a non-member owning land on the reservation who wants
to develop it as a dump could resist and test the extension of tribal land
use restrictions. Under the muddled principles of the Brendale case, 94
there would be at least an argument that the tribe lacked jurisdiction to
prevent or regulate the activity.

94.

Supra note 54.
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On some reservations the reverse situation has arisen.
A tribe,
despairing the lack of economic activity, may concede that it will locate
a dump within its boundaries or, in some cases, actively seek location of
the facility. In these circumstances, local or state governments may object
because of the off-reservation effects on neighbouring communities. As
in the case of a tribe resisting an unwanted dump on non-Indian land on
the reservation, cooperation between the tribal and local governments may
be necessary to resolve the issues satisfactorily.
When the Campo Band of Mission Indians decided to allow a solid
waste disposal plant to be located on its reservation, state and local
authorities objected. The band had concluded that the waste disposal
facility would be the most fruitful of the few options it had for economic
development. The band proceeded to develop its own environmental
regulations and expertise but asserted that it was free of any state
regulation. The state was concerned with the political and environmental
consequences of failing to exert whatever authority it had. Negotiations
between the governments ensued. The tribe maintained its position that
only tribal and federal regulations were applicable on the reservation but
agreed to prepare environmental impact statements requested by the state
and to adopt strict regulations. In addition, the tribe agreed to provide all
requested information to the state and to allow full access by state officials
to the site. In return, the state agreed to furnish technical assistance but
did not abandon its argument that it had jurisdiction over the site.
Litigation was avoided and a practical solution was developed under which
responsibility for regulation was satisfactorily allocated so that the site
would be operated reasonably.9 5
E.

Water Rights

Under principles announced by the United States Supreme Court as early
as 1908, Indian tribes have extensive rights to use water on their
reservations. They are not subject to the state law requirement that water

9'.

See Western Governors' Ass'n, Cooperation on Solid Waste Management:
Tribes and States (1991).
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must be put to a "beneficial use" in order to establish and maintain a water
right. Instead, they are considered to have "reserved" sufficient water to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation.96 States find the presence of such
reserved water rights to be disruptive because it creates uncertainty as to
how much water has been allocated to the tribes and how much is
available for non-Indian uses. Accordingly, the states try to adjudicate the
specific quantities of water to which tribes are entitled and then integrate
the Indian rights with all other (non-Indian) rights.
A federal law allows for the federal government, otherwise immune
from suit, to be joined as a defendant in state adjudications of water
rights.97 The consent has been construed to extend to Indian water rights
because they technically are held by the United States in trust for the
tribes.9 8 Litigation of federal and Indian water rights has proved to be
excruciatingly lengthy and expensive. The parties may spend tens of
millions of dollars trying to deal with the complex technical problems as
well as the legal issues. Only one case, involving rights to water in the
Big Horn River on the Wind River Reservation, has gone all the way
through the court system and determined quantities of Indian reserved
water rights. 99
however. 100

The decision

has not resolved

all the problems,

Matters not decided in quantification litigation, even when it is brought
to a conclusion, may have to be negotiated. In the Big Horn River case,
which was adjudicated and appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
it was necessary to return to the state trial courts to deal with the question

96.

9'
98.

99-

'0

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
43 U.S.C. § 666.
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd by equally divided court, 492 U.S. 406
(1989).
There has also been extensive litigation over whether the tribe could use a
portion of its water rights to maintain streamflows for fish and whether state or
tribal officials have authority to administer water rights on the reservation.
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of whether the state water engineer had authority over non-Indian water
administration on the reservation. The lower state court decided that the
tribal water officials were responsible for administering water of both
Indians and non-Indians on the reservation, subject to court review. That
decision was reversed on appeal.'
Because water, like wildlife management and land use control, needs to
be managed on as unified a basis as possible, it is an area particularly
susceptible to negotiated resolution. In the long run, the administrative
details of managing water on the Wind River Reservation will have to be
settled by agreements of the governments in question.
Many of the negotiated settlements that quantify Indian water rights
include components allocating jurisdictional authority over water
administration and management. For instance, in the settlement of the
water rights of the Fort Peck Reservation Indians with Montana in 1985,
the tribe recognized state jurisdiction over rights created under state law
and agreed to administer on-reservation rights itself but under federal
Department of Interior guidance. In return for these agreements, the state
agreed not to object to the tribe's leasing some of its water off the
reservation. Tribal water marketing is a means of raising needed revenues;
lengthy litigation
it would potentially have been delayed and frustrated by
1 2
of the tribe's legal right to allow off-reservation uses.
Practical water rights issues that the parties might negotiate include
whether state or tribal water law will apply, whether state or tribal
personnel will administer headgates, provision of technical information,
access to lands and water facilities, management of reservoirs and canals,

Io0.
In Re General Adjudication of All Rights to use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P. 2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
10.

See J. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through IntergovernmentalAgreements: The
Pros and Cons of Negotiated Settlements, Indian Water, Collected Essays 42

(1986); J.A. Folk-Williams, "The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve
Water Disputes Involving Indian Water Rights" (1988) 28 Nat. Res. J. 63 at 8286; Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-201, codifying the Fort Peck-Montana Compact.
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allocation of planning responsibilities, and dispute resolution among
individual water users.
F. Taxation
Historically, taxation has been one of the most litigated areas of United
States Indian law. Recently, cases have focused on tribal jurisdiction over
taxation of non-Indians on reservations. As discussed earlier, few areas of
the law are more confusing. One thing that is clear is that states and tribes
will continue to seize upon their own interpretations of existing law in
order to reach revenues from taxable incidents wherever they are found.
Given the ambiguity of the law in the jurisdiction area, and the Supreme
Court's own invitation to subject each case to a "particularized inquiry" by
the judiciary, it is not surprising that the litigation proliferates. Better
results may be possible through negotiations.
Though the usual expectation in litigation is a "winner take all" outcome,
another possible outcome in tax cases is that both the state and the tribe
may be able to impose their taxes on the same subject.

°3

This can

cause administrative problems for the merchants who are required to
collect the taxes, and it can discourage customers who may take their
business elsewhere as a result of the economic impact of dual taxation.
The problem of dual taxation can become even greater where taxes on a
business become a major factor in the decision whether to do business on
the reservation.
A lower court has held that, where state taxes would interfere with tribal
economic development and autonomy, tribal taxes are exclusive."
However, the Supreme Court has held in one recent decision (which could
be limited to its circumstances) that severance taxes can be imposed by

103.

See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Indian
Reservation, 42 U.S. 463 (1976). Cf. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,

490 U.S. 163 (1989).
04.

Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff d, 484 U.S.
997 (1988); Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F. 2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989).
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both the state and the tribe.' °5 In this milieu, taxing entities may prefer
to develop their own joint plans for collection and administration of taxes
rather than subjecting questions to judicial decision.
The state of New Mexico and the Pueblos of Santa Clara and Pojoaque
have agreed to coordinate collection of gross receipts taxes.' °6 The
Pueblos exercise their inherent power to tax and regulate a broad range of
non-Indian activities on the reservation that are either consensual or that
the tribe believes satisfy the test of Montana v. United States of
threatening or harming "the political integrity, economic security, or health
or welfare of the tribe."' 7 Before the agreement, the state taxed only
sales made by non-Indian firms to non-Indians on the reservations while
the Pueblos taxed all sales. This is generally allowed under Supreme
Court rulings, 0 8 but results in inconvenience as well as dual taxation of
non-Indian sales. The Pueblos wanted a resolution of the sales tax issue.
They first raised potential legal problems with a part of the state tax and
also argued that they were not exercising the full extent of tribal taxing
powers. The Pueblos then required all the affected businesses on the
reservation to obtain a federal Indian trader's license. They demanded that
merchants pay tribal taxes but offered to offset any state taxes the
merchants paid against the tribal tax if the merchants agreed to protest the
state tax and to apply for a refund from the state and assign the refund to
the tribe. After being deluged by refund requests, the state agreed to
negotiate with the tribes. The parties agreed to exchange confidential
taxpayer information and establish a basis for equitable apportionment of
taxes collected. This opened the way for a unified tax collection system
with revenues to be shared by the state and the Pueblos.

In Cotton Petroleum, supra note 103, a state oil severance tax was found to be
specifically authorized by a federal statute, and state interests were relatively
substantial.
o6 Gover, Stetson & Williams, P.C., supra note 87 at 277-81.
107. Supra note 50.
'08
E.g., Moe, supra note 103.
105.
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In New York, the state and the Seneca Indian Nation reached a complex
agreement on gasoline and cigarette tax collection.'0 9 After an initial
victory in the highest state court, the matter proceeded to the United States
Supreme Court."0 In the course of litigation, the tribe and the state
negotiated a settlement under which the state would collect the tribal tax
on the reservation for the tribe. In return, the tribe agreed to maintain its
tax at nearly the same rate as the state. The state's concern was that by
undercutting the state tax, the tribe would put itself in a particularly
advantageous position relative to off-reservation businesses. The state's
interest, then, was less in raising revenue than in preventing the tribe from
gaining too great a competitive advantage over non-Indian merchants
located off the reservation. The state conceded that it could not impose its
taxes on the reservation because they were effectively preempted by tribal
taxation. Still, the tribe agreed to minimize "marketing its tax advantage"
but gained an agreement that the tribe would receive the benefit of any
settlement (from the tribal standpoint) that the state might negotiate with
another tribe. The parties were to be subject to binding arbitration of any
disputes that arose under the agreement. The entire deal, however, fell
apart when the New York legislature failed to approve it because of
objections raised by businesses on the reservation.
G. Land Claims
Land claims present an appropriate context for resolving inevitable
conflicts beyond simply compensation. A land claims settlement reached
by the Puyallup Tribe and the United States included resolution of tough
Vestiges of the tribe's ancestral lands were
jurisdictional issues."'
located within the industrial area of the city of Tacoma and extended to
submerged lands in Puget Sound. Complex and lengthy negotiations dealt
". Gover, Stetson & Williams, P.C. supra note 87 at 290-93.
110. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. Dep't. of Taxation and Finance of State of New
York, 164 A.D. 2d 300, 564 N.Y.S. 2d. 491 (1990), cert. granted and judgment
vacated subnom. Dep 't. of Taxation and Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea
& Bros., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 926 (1992).
Washington Indian (Puyallup) Land Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 101-41,
103 Stat. 83 (June 21, 1989), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1973.
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with fishery protection, use of submerged lands, as well as jurisdiction
over these lands. The tribe got clear title to certain lands, jurisdiction over
trust property, provision of social services, and $46 million in cash. The
state of Washington retained jurisdictionl2 over non-trust land and
extinguished certain other potential claims."
V.

Strategies for Successful Negotiation of
Intergovernmental Agreements

The conditions for negotiation must be right." 13

Above all, Indian

112.

Gover, Stetson & Williams, P.C., supra note 87 at 293-96.

"3

There are numerous sources of advice available to potential negotiators of
intergovernmental agreements. See e.g., S.B. Goldberg, Dispute Resolution:
Negotiations, Mediation, and Other Processes(1992); E.F. Lynch, Negotiation
and Settlement (Rochester: Lawyers Co-operative, 1992); L.L. Teply, Legal
Negotiation in a Nutshell (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1992). The applicability
and utility of these sources vary from case to case, though there are some
especially apt observations and suggestions concerning interjurisdictional
negotiations. Conditions that tend to lead to a successful conclusion of a
negotiated intergovernmental agreement with Indian tribes can be summarized:
1. A mutual sense of urgency
2. An opportunity for mutual gain
3. Uncertain results if the outcome must be litigated
4. Outside force of leadership or a personality who will keep
the parties talking
See Thorson, supra note 102 at 42-45. Potential obstacles to the success of
such negotiations have been identified as:
1. Problems of communication that may be complicated by
cultural differences in perception of nonverbal signals;
2. Problems of emotional baggage and residual distrust as to
genuine motives of the parties;
3. Interposing strategic bargaining and adversarial winnertakes-all attitudes into the dispute;
4. Existence of a "settlement gap" based on differing goodfaith perceptions of facts, the law, technical issues, or possible
outcomes of litigation;
5. Circumstances that change during the bargaining process.
See Proceedings, Tribal State Relations: Hope for the Future, Symposium
sponsored by the University of South Dakota School of Law (1990).

1993
Revue d'itudes constitutionnelles

David H. Getches
governments and their non-Indian counterparts must be motivated to solve
a problem.
Parties can influence conditions that motivate their
counterparts. In the United States, negotiations have frequently grown out
of litigation or the threat of it. Often the prospect of a long and expensive
court battle is enough to bring the parties to the negotiating table. An
issue can be precipitated by assertions of tribal jurisdiction in conflict with
neighbouring governments, or of state jurisdiction that impacts heavily on
a tribe or its individual members.
Even without a ripe conflict, governments may be sufficiently
uncomfortable with a confusing regulatory, taxation, or law enforcement
regime to seek a negotiated resolution. States, like tribes, are troubled by
the unpredictability of Indian law. Although tribes have fared badly in the
courts for the last few years, they generally prevailed in cases during the
1960s and 1970s. More than any other factor, the bold and effective
assertions of sovereign tribal authority during the last ten or fifteen years
built on an episode of supportive court decisions have convinced nonIndian governments to negotiate with tribes as peers.
The recent interest in intergovernmental agreements in the United States,
however, is owing to more than the legal and geographic complexities of
Indian jurisdiction. There has been a generally heightened level of
attention to Native American issues. The National Conference of State
Legislatures attributes this to four factors. First, the diminishing judicial
protection of Indian interests evidenced by recent decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court has forced the tribes to focus their energies on influencing
the political process. Second, the number of Native Americans holding
public office is increasing. (There are at least 30 Indian legislators in 13
states.) Third, as discussed earlier, the federal government has explicitly
empowered the tribes to receive certain delegations of authority. Fourth,
"a growing sense is emerging among enlightened policy-makers that Indian
tribes deserve respect as legitimate partners in the governance of
America."' 14
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In Canada, intergovernmental negotiation could be triggered by judicial
actions, federal and provincial legislation such as delegations of
responsibility to First Nations, land claims settlements, and ad hoc attempts
to solve particular problems. As discussed earlier, recent court decisions
tend to favour aboriginal rights and First Nations' activism is growing.
Committed aboriginal leaders and non-Indian political figures can play
vitally important roles in focusing issues and facilitating negotiations that
reach practical solutions. Public awareness and information is also an
essential component.
First Nations jointly or individually may decide to pursue a strategy of
vindicating their aboriginal sovereignty. As they do, negotiation may
appropriately emerge as a powerful mechanism." 5 It may be as
attractive to non-Native neighbours as it is to the First Nations themselves
because of the relative efficiency and certainty that agreed solutions can
produce.
Negotiation is not simple or easy, though it can be effective. As in
litigation, there are especially serious problems of representation, funding,
and enforcement that should be considered. The first two problems must
be considered in advance of negotiations. Enforcement is one of the most
important issues to be addressed throughout the process.
The parties need to know who represents whom and to trust their own
representatives (leaders, attorneys, officials, etc.). In particular, tribes
should have their own competent, independent counsel. Although the U.S.
government has a fiduciary relationship as "trustee" for Indian tribes and
resources, experience has shown that the credibility of an agreement may
depend on having counsel separate from the federal attorneys. A
resolution favourable to tribes may be unfavourable to the United States
because of cost conflict with a federal project or program, or because of

15.

A development which Ian Cowie has ably documented and illustrated with a
flowchart. See supra note 12 at 19.
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politics." l6 Independent representation involves the expense of hiring
lawyers. It will be fruitless, however, to attempt negotiation of major
agreements implementing tribal sovereignty without professional counsel.
Parties should not underestimate the importance of having funds
available to conduct and later implement a settlement. Beyond paying for
attorneys, there are costs of travel and perhaps hiring a facilitator.
Research and expert help may be necessary. Negotiation is usually
cheaper than litigation, but it is not without substantial costs.
The actual agreement coming out of a settlement may require
considerable funding. Administrative costs and other expenses may be
necessary to carry out the terms of the agreement. Virtually all of the one
dozen water rights settlements successfully negotiated with Indian tribes
in the United States have had an ingredient of substantial federal funding.
Monies were made available for construction of water facilities, purchase
of water rights administration, and for general economic development
needs of Indian tribes.
Because most agreements are sought in order to avoid or end litigation
or other contentious confrontations, enforcement issues should be
anticipated. In negotiated settlements of litigation like water rights claims,
a common way of resolving disputes is for the court to approve the
settlement and retain continuing jurisdiction over matters that arise later.
Disputes about the terms of an agreement unrelated to pending litigation
could lead to a lawsuit and proceed to court just as a contract matter
would. Treating the agreement as a contract may be inappropriate,
however. First, the parties are themselves sovereigns and the adjudication
would presumably be in the courts of one or the other. Second, the rules
of construction and the approach taken by a court to an ordinary
commercial contract may be different from those that ought to apply to an
interjurisdictional arrangement.
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Indeed, the United States government has often found itself in a conflict-ofinterest situation with Indian tribes. See, e.g., Chambers, "Judicial Enforcement
of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians" (1975) 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1213.
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One method of dealing with enforcement and dispute resolution is to
specify in the agreement that such issues will be subject to arbitration or
mediation. Binding arbitration was agreed upon by the state of New York
and the Seneca Nation in the example discussed earlier. That agreement,
however, was never implemented. The use of professional mediators has
been rare in formulating Indian-tribal interjurisdictional arrangements and
so it is not surprising that they almost never refer enforcement disputes to
mediation. The nuances of different dispute resolution techniques are not
well understood by governments at all levels.' 7 Parties should consider
the utility of incorporating these in alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.
To the extent that agreements anticipate and address contingencies, they
can avoid most of the need for enforcement. Thus, a goal of negotiation
should be to reach a self-executing agreement that resolves predictable
problems in advance. Of course it is difficult to do this where new
activities, such as taxation, control of environmental pollution, or
adjudication of child custody cases will be undertaken by the tribe. The
parties may want to consider entering into an interim agreement. After an
initial term, during which issues can be identified, the parties can negotiate
a modified final agreement based on a review of the original assumptions,
facts, and any changed conditions.
Enduring agreements most often result from negotiations based on free
and open communications between parties who treat one another as equals.
Even "unsuccessful" negotiations may be necessary steps toward creating
an atmosphere of respect and free exchange of ideas that becomes the
basis for later success in reaching an agreement. The first negotiation
may, in time, open the door to other accords. This argues for a strategy
that starts with relatively manageable problems and conflicts and escalates
later to the more difficult ones as the parties become more confident,
competent, and mutually successful in working together as colleagues.
Agreeing on an agenda and a ranking of issues to be negotiated is an
important first step.

"7

See Folk-Williams, supra note 102 at 93-95.
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VI.

Conclusion

The great potential for state-tribal interjurisdictional agreements has not
been fully realized in the United States. The number of attempts is large
while the number of reported agreements relatively low. Yet, a statistical
assessment is not entirely indicative of success. More than ever, state and
tribal governments are resorting to negotiation and cooperative agreements.
Given the historical bitterness of conflict between states and tribes, not all
of which has been confined to the courtroom, it is not surprising that some
negotiations and attempts at reaching intergovernmental agreements do not
succeed. Perhaps it is more remarkable that so many have been
successful.
Canadians may be able to glean lessons from the United States
experience. Whether or not Canada moves toward a constitutional
declaration of aboriginal sovereignty, interjurisdictional agreements will be
useful mechanisms as the First Nations assert their sovereignty more
emphatically in the courts, in Parliament, with provinces, and in land
claims settlements. Of course if constitutional status is ultimately given
to sovereignty of tribes, it will require definition and that can come
through negotiation.
In absence of a constitutional sovereignty declaration, Canadian bands
may be reluctant to anticipate in negotiation if they must operate under bylaws pursuant to the Indian Act that characterize their status as tantamount
to a rural municipality." 8 They will be negotiating with provinces and
the national government over issues far more momentous than the concerns
of a municipality. Without the constitutional declaration of sovereignty,
their dealings could remain subject to the determination by the Minister of
Indian Affairs that they have reached a sufficient stage of development to
deal with certain matters. Presumably, however, these questions are
themselves within the competence of the parties to negotiate and resolve.

118.

Bartlett, supra note 2 at 23.

Vol. I, No. I
Review of ConstitutionalStudies

Negotiated Sovereignty
The Minister may be able to delegate some of his authority to a band."

9

It is possible that Section 35(1) could be construed to recognize
implicitly traditional aboriginal governments and governing powers. 2°
This avoids the unseemly and possibly distasteful aspects of other
governments "delegating" authority to bands as if they did not already have
authority. Though suspended by the Indian Act, aboriginal governments
arguably have been only inchoate and can be revitalized simply by their
beginning to exercise the aboriginal powers. In any event, the existence
of theoretical questions need not impede progress in actualizing selfgovernment.
The absence of formal constitutional ratification of the sovereign status
of First Nations should not be an obstacle to negotiation of agreements
with and by them. An essential purpose of the agreements is, after all, to
help define sovereignty. In the United States we are still struggling with
the meaning of inherent tribal sovereignty, though it was proclaimed by the
Supreme Court 160 years ago. Thus, the United States' version of tribal
sovereignty, no matter how venerable and rooted in judicial precedent,
does not necessarily create a foundation superior to the opportunity Canada
has today for confronting issues of aboriginal self-government through
negotiation.
A variety of conditions favour a movement toward intergovernmental
agreements with First Nations. Unresolved land claims create political
leverage and attract considerable popular attention and support. Canadian
courts have shown a recent willingness to entertain and adjudge Indian

"9
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Certain authority, e.g. taxation of reserve land interests, can be authorized to
bands that have "reached an advanced stage of development." See the Indian Act
R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 83(1). Apparently the provision is rarely used. See
Bartlett supra note 8 at 600.
It has been argued that First Nations still retain their aboriginal sovereignty. See
House of Commons, supra note 9. A bill to broaden the Minister's authority to
confer greater authority on bands through negotiations failed. See R. Bartlett,
Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in Canada: A Homeland (Saskatoon:

University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1990) at 162.
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claims fairly. Most importantly, the bands have actively participated in
negotiations leading to the proposal for constitutional entrenchment of their
sovereignty. The bands have informed leaders, available expertise, and the
attention of national and provincial politicians as well as the public.
With the shelving of constitutional reform, First Nations are likely to
redirect their energies and adopt new strategies to vindicate their
sovereignty. Intergovernmental negotiation can play a central role in those
strategies. Likewise, Canadian national and provincial governments can
pursue negotiated agreements as a source of predictability, efficiency, and
equity.
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